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TRADE TRANSPARENCY: A CALL FOR SURFACING
UNSEEN DEALS
Kathleen Claussen*
For many years, the executive branch has concludedforeign commercial agreements with tradingpartnerspursuant to delegated authority
from Congress. The deals govern the contours of a wide range of U.S.
inbound and outbound trade: from food safety rules for imported products to procedures and specifications of exported goods, to name two.
The problem is that often no one-apartfrom the executive branch negotiators-knows what these deals contain. A lack of transparency rules
has inhibited the publication of and reportingto Congress of these unseen
deals. Dozens if not hundreds offoreign commercial deals are unseen in
two ways: (1) The executive branch rarely makes their texts readily available, and (2) the texts of many such deals appearlargely to have been lost
by the executive branch itself This Piece lays out how the Biden Administrationand Congress could amelioratesuch problems in the trade transparency and recordkeepingsystems. It identifies the flaws in our separation of trade law powers that have led to the hiddenness of such deals,
drawingfrom interviews with U. S. officials that help to shed light on the
deals' obscurity. Expecting that the Biden Administration is likely to rely
on these deals despite these acute problems, this Piece suggests changes to
the system without hampering the executive's use of this increasingly

important tool.
INTRODUCTION

In 2020, the United States entered into at least thirty-two different
commercial agreements with U.S. trading partners governing myriad topics, from automobiles to special commercial zones.1 Take, for example, the

* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law; Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Institute of International Economic Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Special
thanks to the several U.S. government staff who were willing to be interviewed for this Piece.
Thanks also to Curt Bradley, Oona Hathaway, and participants in the Georgetown International Economic Law Colloquium for their comments and engagement on this subject. Daria Pietropaolo and Isabelle Janssen provided excellent research assistance. Finally,
I am grateful for the support of the terrific Columbia Law Review team, especially that pro-

vided by Dori Rahbar.
1. For a partial list, see Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2021 Trade Policy
Agenda and 2020 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program 1-34 (2021), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021

/2021%20Trade%20Agenda/Online%20PDF%202021%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda
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agreement between Mexico and the United States that allows U.S. companies to import grain-oriented electrical steel from Mexico under certain
conditions.2 Another such agreement commits the United States to beginning a regulatory process concerning the intellectual property protection
of a Bolivian brandy.3 Others of these thirty-two agreements change tariff
rates or some make new rules, while still others acknowledge foreign commitments for U.S. products. Given President Joe Biden's statements that
big congressional-executive trade agreements are low on his priority list,'
these executive-only deals are very likely to remain in place as the primary
trade policymaking tool for the Biden Administration.
Puzzlingly, neither of the two agreements given as examples is available to the public-nor are a significant number of negotiated agreements.5 Few trade agreements have been made available to Congress
either, despite Congress's constitutional primacy on such matters.6 In fact,
there are scarce requirements for the publication of or reporting to Congress of our foreign commercial agreements; those that may apply are contested by the agencies to which they are directed.7 The absence of a clear
regime has also led to recordkeeping difficulties.8 The result is that frequently neither Congress nor the public, and sometimes not even the
bureaucrats in the executive branch, know what these deals contain.
This absence of transparency and of organizational obligations contrasts with the State Department-led system for other types of executive
agreements.9 And yet, the need for public transparency and awareness is
likely greater in the case of trade agreements given their business and regulatory impacts. Trade deals operate in valuable economic spaces, and they

%20and%202020%20Annual%20Report.pdf

[https://perma.cc/E9VSE3SB]

[hereinafter

Annual Report].
2. See Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Statement on Successful Conclusion of Steel Negotiations With Mexico (Nov. 5, 2020), https://ustr.
gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/november/ustr-statementsuccessful-conclusion-steel-negotiations-mexico [https://perma.cc/P7LP-S8RJ].
3. See Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative C.J. Mahoney and Bolivian Foreign Minister Karen Longaric Exchange Letters

on Unique Distilled Spirits (Jan. 24, 2020), https://ustr.gov/index.php/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2020/january/deputy-us-trade-representative-cj-mahoney-and-bolivian-foreign-minister-karen-longaric-exchange
[https://perma.cc/4Z8D-778
N] [hereinafter Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., Letters on Unique Distilled Spirits].
4. Joe Biden, Responses to United Steelworkers' Federal Candidate Questionnaire,
USW Voices (May 17, 2020), https://www.uswvoices.org/endorsed-candidates/biden/
BidenUSWQuestionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE8A-875P]
[hereinafter Steelworkers'
Federal Candidate Questionnaire].
5. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2018) (directing the Secretary of State to transmit international agreements to Congress).
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do so entirely under delegated authority. For these reasons, their transparency both to the public and to Congress is especially important.
This Piece lays out how the Biden Administration and Congress could
ameliorate these problems in the trade transparency apparatus while still
relying on executive trade deals to achieve U.S. foreign economic goals.
Dozens if not hundreds of trade executive agreements (TEAs) are unseen
in two ways: (1) The executive branch rarely makes their texts readily available to Congress or to the public despite acknowledging or sometimes
even heralding their negotiation, and (2) the texts of some of these TEAs
appear largely to have been lost by the executive branch itself. Part I analyzes how a form of trade exceptionalism in the executive agreement-making process has contributed to the invisibility of TEAs. Part II turns to the
recordkeeping struggles that have helped to hide TEAs, relying in part on
interviews with U.S. officials that have shed light on their obscurity. Part
III argues that these dual flaws are more problematic for commercial
agreements than for other executive agreements considering the practical
effects and constitutional positioning of TEAs. Part IV recommends
reforms for Congress and the new Administration to change the way
unseen trade deals are reported and published without hampering the executive's use of this increasingly important tool.
I. THE NONTRANSPARENCY REGIME
The Constitution sets out that regulation of foreign commerce is a
congressional prerogative,10 although Congress has largely delegated that
responsibility to the executive." The key agency in making trade deals of

all types is the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). USTR is
the lead negotiator for both major free trade agreements (FTAs), like the
recent United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, as well as most other
trade-related policy negotiations. It is "responsible to the President and
the Congress for the administration of[] trade agreements programs."12
Over the last forty years, Congress has maintained significant control over
the FTA negotiations into which the USTR and the President have
entered. In those contexts, the executive not only has to report regularly
to Congress and follow congressional objectives but also has to submit the
final agreement for Congress to approve in both houses. 13 Those reporting
requirements have grown more stringent since they were first impleme-

10. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. See Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy 8,

432, 452 (2019) (discussing the political history of trade in the United States).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1)(F) (2018); see also U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Publ'n No.
4986, The Year in Trade 2018: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 70th Report

1, 31 (2019), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4986.pdf

[https://perma.cc/

4XN9-6SV4] (defining the trade agreements program and its statutory authorities).
13. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 4202 (setting out trade agreements authority).
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nted in 1974.14 But while Congress was tightening disciplines for public
engagement as well as for its own input and monitoring of big FTAs, it was
paying little attention to agreements made by the executive alone: TEAs.
In fact, increased pressures in the FTA process, among other congressional demands, may have prompted executive branch officials to deploy
TEAs more often to achieve trade policy goals. As one former U.S. Trade
Representative hinted, USTR officials choose TEAs over FTAs to avoid triggering statutory obligations that require them to go through Congress.1 5
TEAs are not perfect substitutes for FTAs-for example, they do not make
reciprocal commitments to reduce tariff rates on substantially all trade
between two or more countries.1 6 But they have been used to circumvent
congressional restraints to achieve some of the same outcomes, especially
when it comes to regulatory harmonization and the development of market access.17 Plus, the institutional design for trade lawmaking with USTR
as the lead, instead of the State Department as for many other agreements,
created a ripe environment in favor of using TEAs: As TEAs were removed
from the "ordinary" international and trade lawmaking regimes, they fell
further off the congressional, scholarly, and public radars and became the
path of least resistance to accomplishing trade business. 18
But neither the popularity of these agreements among trade lawmakers nor their special procedural arrangements fully explains why or
how the general transparency regime for executive agreements often
excludes them. According to the 1972 Case-Zablocki Reporting Act (Case
Act), the Secretary of State is required to publish all "international agreements" into which the United States has entered each calendar year and
to transmit those to Congress.19 In accordance with the regulations implementing that statute, agencies must send their concluded agreements to

14. See Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43 Yale. J. Int'l L. 315,
318, 336 (2018) ("Notwithstanding the passage of time since that low period in the trust of
the Executive, the number and forms of congressional requirements for executive engagement have only increased.").
15. See Anshu Siripurapu, Portman: Appellate Body Nominations Block Needed to

Achieve WTO Reform, Inside U.S. Trade (Nov. 8, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/dailynews/portman-appellate-body-nominations-block-needed-achieve-wto-reform
(on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (quoting Senator Rob Portman attributing the Trump Administration's choice to go around Congress to conclude a deal with Japan to the difficulty in
using the fast-track process).
16. See Kathleen Claussen, Trade's Mini-Deals, 62 Va. J. Int'l L. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 13-14), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3836909 [https://perma.cc/
JDS4-E2FU] [hereinafter Claussen, Mini-Deals] (explaining what trade executive agreements do).

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See 1 U.S.C. §§ 112a-112b (2018). The Secretary may exclude certain agreements
where the public interest is insufficient to justify their publication-either because they "do
not create private rights or duties, or establish standards intended to govern government
action in the treatment of private individuals" or because "in view of the limited or specia-
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the State Department for the State Department to transmit those agreements to Congress. 20 When it comes to trade agreements, however, USTR
is, in practice, often the first and last stop. USTR plays what would, in other
foreign relations circumstances, be the State Department's "clearinghouse
role" 2 1-and
this immediately creates distinctions in how those agreements are handled. Just as TEA-making is removed from the State Department's oversight in the mechanics of dealmaking, 22 it is also left out of the
State Department's reporting and publishing repertoire.
TEAs have not been regularly transmitted to the State Department in
accordance with State's Case Act regulations for at least three reasons. First
is a statutory interpretation debate between the agencies about the precise
contours of what the Case Act covers. The State Department and other
agencies sometimes disagree about what the statute requires agencies to
provide to the State Department. 23 Some statutes require the President to
separately report trade-related agreements to Congress, for example.24
Second is some degree of trade exceptionalism that is rooted in U.S. trade
law's unique institutional history and engagement with Congress. 25 USTR
in particular justifies an exceptional position for reporting purposes based
on its close relationship with congressional committees. 26 Third, State
lized nature of the public interest in such agreements, such interest can adequately be satisfied by an alternative means" (among other criteria)-although copies must be made avail-

able upon request. Id. § 112a(b) (2) (B)-(C).
20. 22 C.F.R. § 181.5 (2020) (instructing agencies to share their concluded agreements
with the State Department within twenty days).
21. See Harold Hongju Koh, Address: Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking,
101 Geo. L.J. Online 1, 9 (2012). Harold Koh discusses how the "clearinghouse role" involves rigorous legal and policy review on foreign policy activities and negotiations across
the executive branch. Id.
22. Claussen, Mini-Deals, supra note 16, at 17-19 (describing how the trade dealmak-

ing process is separate from the making of other agreements).
23. See Interview with Former USTR Official A, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 19, 2019)
(explaining that UTSR has experienced problems in working together with the State Department); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Failed
Transparency Regime for Executive Agreements: An Empirical and Normative Analysis, 134

Harv. L. Rev. 629, 673 n.204 (2020) (explaining that USTR and State Department officials
disagree about whether certain trade agreements may bypass reporting requirements).

24. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 4202(a) (2) (2018) (requiring the President to notify Congress
of trade agreements).
25. See Kathleen Claussen, Our Trade Law System, 73 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 195,198203 (2020) (setting out the ways in which trade is exceptional and has unique institutional

positioning).
26. In recent years, two USTR policy staff have been responsible for transmitting agreements to the State Department. The lead attorney prepares an electronic copy of the agreement and a paper copy in a formal plastic portfolio, typically printed on special, longer

paper for ceremonial signing. They also prepare a cover page that summarizes the agreement, discusses whether there is a need for implementing any legislation, and identifies the
source of legal authority for the agreement. Those materials are then passed to the policy
staff for transmission to the State Department. USTR staff sometimes treat the deadlines for
this process as "advisory" and as a result do not transmit the materials to the State Department in a timely fashion, if at all. See Interview with Former USTR Official A, supra note 23.
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Department regulations exclude from reporting (and from publishing)
some TEAs based on an internal determination that they are "non-binding," or fall in other specialized categories.27 In other words, even when
the State Department receives TEAs from USTR and other agencies, the
State Department's regulations exempt certain trade agreements from
publication. 28
Few other statutes require USTR to report to Congress about TEAswhether before, during, or after their entry into force. Thus, for many
years, Congress has directly and indirectly authorized the President to enter into foreign commercial agreements with no guidelines on keeping the
legislature informed. There is no organized structure for reporting and
engaging with Congress apart from the rare, individualized reporting
requirement for a particular type of TEA.29 To be sure, Congress regularly
asks for reports about trade lawmaking activities, including what has been
known as the U.S. "trade agreements program," but this typically amounts
to either reporting just about FTAs or a list of TEAs that is rarely scrutinized by the Hill or other stakeholders.3 0
The institutional fault lines between USTR and the State Department
have developed into a chasm that engulfs TEAs more than other executive
agreements, even though one of the original purposes of the institutional

27. See 1 U.S.C. §§ 112a-112b (2018); 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a) (2020) (defining the categories of agreements that are transmitted to Congress). This arrangement incentivizes the
State Department to interpret "non-binding" broadly, since the distinction between binding
and nonbinding determines publication and reporting requirements. The State Department is inconsistent in this practice, however. It has published certain semi-nonbinding trade agreements but not others, despite the fact that those agreements were identical in operative content. For example, the State Department makes available the Argentina-U.S. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement but not the Angola-U.S. Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement. The latter does not appear in the State Department's
Treaties in Force publication and was not given a "Treaties and Other International Act Se-

ries" designation. Compare Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Argentine Republic,

Arg.-U.S., Mar. 23, 2016, T.I.A.S. No. 16-323.1 (establishing the United States-Argentina
Council on Trade and Investment), with Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic

of Angola, Angl.-U.S., May 19, 2009, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US-Angola%20TIFA%20English.pdf [https://perma.cc/UU2G-25NV] (establishing the United
States-Angola Council on Trade and Investment). Although, USTR has published both documents together. See Trade & Investment Framework Agreements, Off. of the U.S. Trade
Representative,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agree-

ments [https://perma.cc/7Y8W-NHQ9] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
28. See 22 C.F.R. § 181.8(a) (2), 181.8 (a) (8) (exempting from the publication rule textiles agreements and tariff schedules).

29. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 4202(a) (2) (requiring the President to notify Congress of the
President's intent to enter into a TEA that modifies duties).
30. See id. (setting out the requirements for the President regarding reporting on the
trade agreements program); Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 1, at Annex
II (setting out the agreements that the U.S. Trade Representative is monitoring); U.S. Int'l

Trade Comm'n, supra note 12 (providing a report on the trade agreements program).
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separation of trade was to improve the trade agreement-making process. 31
By excepting trade in institution, statute, and regulation, TEAs often
remain off the grid.
II. DISAPPEARING DEALS
Unfortunately, the TEA system has failed as a reporting and publishing regime, and as a recordkeeping regime. Each year, USTR
reportedly monitors several hundred TEAs for U.S. trading partners' compliance; in fact, USTR appears to be flying blind with regard to twenty percent of those agreements. As this Part shows, in many instances, the government has not only failed to make a TEA publicly available or to report
it to Congress but also has lost the agreement altogether.
Government agencies lack a comprehensive count or collection of
trade-related agreements, despite the attention Congress and government
watchdogs have afforded this problematic state of play.32 A 1999 Government Accountability Office report concluded that the Department of
Commerce, the State Department, and USTR were not tracking trade
agreements appropriately or effectively. There is no evidence that the
agencies implemented the changes that the report recommended. 33 The
agencies' websites remain incomplete, as do their hard-copy collections:
Of the more than 500 TEAs listed in the USTR Annual Report, only about
forty percent are publicly available on the USTR site. 34 Others can be
located through subscription services or, occasionally, through the State
Department treaty databases. 35 Still others are not made public at all. 36
31. See 119 Cong. Rec. 40,509 (1973) ("[T]he position was created to provide both
better focus and centralized direction for treating trade negotiations and trade problems
from an overall commercial point of view-and to downplay the strictly foreign policy orientation ...
of the Department of State."); Thomas R. Graham, The Reorganization of

Trade Policymaking: Prospects and Problems, 13 Cornell Int'l L.J. 221, 224-25 (1980) (explaining that "the positions that each department strives to promote in trade negotiations frequently conflict").

32. See, e.g., U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., GAO/NSIAD-00-76, International Trade: Strategy
Needed to Better Monitor and Enforce Trade Agreements 13 n.10 (2000) ("The actual
number of trade agreements currently in force is unknown, although we found over 400
agreements that entered into force since 1984."); U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., GAO/NSIAD-00-24,
International Trade: Improvements Needed to Track and Archive Trade Agreements 4
(1999) [hereinafter GAO Report 1999] (noting that "[t]he number of trade agreements to
which the United States is currently a party is uncertain" and that "key agencies were unable
to provide a definitive count of all U.S. trade agreements that are currently in force").
33. See GAO Report 1999, supra note 32, at 5 (noting that the GAO was making recommendations); see also U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-17-399, Trade Enforcement: Information on U.S. Agencies' Monitoring and Enforcement Resources for International Trade Agreements 10 (2017) (commenting that the GAO did not independently
confirm whether agencies were acting consistently with their monitoring commitments).
34. Notably, the Annex failed to account for 225 additional TEAS found on the USTR
website. See Claussen, Mini-Deals, supra note 16, app. at 63.

35. See id. at 7.
36. See id.
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Some that are more than five years old have been lost by the U.S. government, according to government staff.3 7 In short, despite annual reports
on the subject from both USTR and the International Trade Commission,
no government agency has a comprehensive collection. 38
The specific reasons for the disappearances of TEAs vary. In speaking
with government officials who have worked on negotiating and monitoring these agreements, several disconcerting causes and confusions
came to light. TEAs are occasionally misplaced in institutional turnover,
for example. 39 One official noted that in a technology migration several
years ago, information technology professionals lost documents, even
though policymakers had requested they be kept.40 Another commented
that certain agreements "probably were never public"" due to institutional capacity constraints. One former official commented that her
usual routine while at USTR was to travel almost weekly, and it was impossible to ensure that agreements negotiated one week would be forwarded
through the proper channels before taking off again: It was hard enough
to "switch out one binder for the other" and get back on the road.42
Another former official shared that there is extensive "lore" on oral deals
that were also concluded by U.S. bureaucrats. He recalled one instance
where an abbreviated summary of a deal was jotted down in the margins
of a map purchased at the gift shop of the negotiating venue; no other
record of the agreement exists. 43 Still other officials have surmised that

37. See E-mail from USTR Official 1 to author (Apr. 28, 2020) (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) [hereinafter E-mail from USTR Official 1] (explaining that documents were
lost after an update to the document retrieval system); E-mail from USTR Official 2 to author (May 4, 2020) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining the lack of access to

particular agreements).
38. To be sure, USTR has a robust records management plan consistent with the Fed-

eral Records Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3101 (2018). See Fred L. Ames, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Instruction 511.2, USTR Records Management
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/gsp/speeches/re-

Program

(2010),

ports/IP/ACTA/about%20us/reading%20room/USTR%20Instruction%20511-2%20Records%20Management%20Program.
pdf [https://perma.cc/A36R-JLAG] (outlining staff duties for records safeguarding as required by federal law). But that plan has failed to capture these trade agreements.
39. See Interview with Former USTR Official A, supra note 23 (explaining that no central filing system exists).

40. See E-mail from USTR Official 1, supra note 37.
41. See E-mail from USTR Official 4 to Isabelle Janssen, Rsch. Assistant & Student,

Univ. of Mia. Sch. of L. (June 15, 2020) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
42. See E-mail from Former USTR Official C to author (Oct. 26, 2020) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).

43. E-mail from Former USTR Official B to author (Feb. 1, 2021) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).

2022]

A CALL FOR SURFACING UNSEEN DEALS

9

certain agreements may be available in paper archives, offsite and inaccessible to current staff." Another has suggested that their obscurity might be
purposeful.4 5
The failed recordkeeping regime for TEAs would be less significant if
these deals were not meaningful or were limited to just one administration, for example. The sparse discussion of their whereabouts or content could be reflective of their highly limited substance. But their past
suggests they are widely used across many years with considerable regulatory impact and that their future is likely to be fulsome.
III. BLIND SPOTS

Trade practitioners and some academics have lamented the limited
transparency surrounding major congressional-executive FTAs.47 Yet most
of those complaints in the FTA-making process relate to negotiating drafts
and differentiated access to the agencies making decisions on agreement
text. In the case of TEAs, as seen above, the transparency challenges extend even further and pose their own difficulties. Trade agencies are not
the only federal agencies making less formal deals, 48 but they should not
be able to have it both ways: both to engage in off-the-books dealmaking
and to rely on those deals as enforceable trade rules. Doing so places the
burden on the public to parse what is legally binding or significant rather
than clearly staking out what is a mere political commitment. This Part
outlines four major problems with the present arrangement and the invisi-

bility of TEAs.
First, as a matter of good governance and diplomacy, texts of trade
agreements ought to be made available. No statutory authority-apart
from that which is contested under the Case Act-requires the ordinary

44. E-mail from USTR Official 5 to author (July 14, 2020) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). According to one bureaucrat, there may be more available in the USTR building, but the pandemic has prevented anyone from checking if this is true. E-mail from USTR

Official 6 to author (Apr. 21, 2020) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
45. See Warren H. Maruyama, The Wonderful World of VRAs: Free Trade and the

Goblet of Fire, 24 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 149, 160 (2007) (commenting that certain types
of TEAS, such as the Voluntary Restraint Agreement or VRA, "could avoid some of the domestic and international opprobrium attached to [their content] through their obscurity").
46. See, e.g., Kathleen Claussen, Regulating Foreign Commerce Through Multiple

Pathways: A Case Study, 130 Yale L.J. Forum 266, 278-80 (2020) (discussing the considerable impact of current trade agreements "on the administrative state" and how future trade
agreements will likely do the same).
47. See, e.g., Maria Laura Marceddu, Implementing Transparency and Public Partici-

pation in FTA Negotiations: Are the Times A-Changin'?, 21 J. Int'l Econ. L. 681, 682-83
(2018) (describing how civil society groups have challenged transparency deficiencies in

major trade agreement negotiations).
48. See Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 Vand.J. Transnat'l
L. 885, 891-93 (2016) ("The United States increasingly engages international regimes
through less formal, lower profile mechanisms, which raise transparency as well as accountability concerns.").
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publication of a TEA before or after concluding it, despite that many TEAs
have the effect and force of domestic regulations.49 Surprisingly, USTR
and other agencies will sometimes note the conclusion of a TEA but not
share the text, even with those who may be affected directly or indirectly
by its rulemaking.50 Unsurprisingly, however, few TEAs have been subject
to challenge given that there is no clear path to judicial review nor a formally institutionalized review process; therefore, there is no pressure on
agencies to make agreements public after they enter into force. Even
agreements lost within the U.S. government may remain legally and operationally significant by means of incorporation into agency practices.51 This
situation becomes more problematic if the agencies wish to change course
without awareness that their prior course was the implementation of a
now-lost TEA.
Second, TEAs create binding commitments of value to at least some
market actors. TEAs can serve as problem-solving tools that create market
access for U.S. actors, impose rules for foreign actors, and more. 2 That

49. Claussen, Mini-Deals, supra note 16, at 13-14 (noting how TEAs can act as regulations).
50. See, e.g., Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, Letters on Unique Distilled Spirits,
supra note 4; UAE Agrees to Section 232 Quota Deal on Aluminum Imports, Inside U.S.
Trade (Jan. 20, 2021), https://insidetrade.com/trade/uae-agrees-section-232-quota-dealaluminum-imports (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Press Release, Off. of the U.S.
Trade Representative, United States and Brazil Update Agreement on Trade and Economic
Cooperation With New Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/october/
united-states-and-brazil-update-agreement-trade-and-economic-cooperation-new-protocoltrade-rules (on file with the Columbia Law Review).

&

51. Some staff have acknowledged their operationalization while remaining uncertain
as to whether they can make available the texts of the agreements themselves to members
of the public. See, e.g., E-mail from USTR Official 3 to Isabelle Janssen, Rsch. Assistant

Student, Univ. of Mia. Sch. of L. (July 1, 2020) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting
that the documents requested were not able to be shared since they were not automatically

public).
52. See, e.g., Exchange of Letters Between Robert E. Lighthizer, Ambassador, U.S.

Trade Rep., and Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affs., Canada (Nov. 30, 2018) (discussing Canada's provision of access to pipeline networks, including promising that a Pacific
Northwest power service provider will offer "treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment afforded to utilities located outside the Pacific Northwest"); Exchange of
Letters Between Michael B. G. Froman, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Rep., and Vu Huy Hoang,
Minister of Indus. & Trade, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Feb. 4, 2016) (setting out service
requirements for cross-border electronic payments); Agreement Between the United States
of America and Chile, Exchange of Letters from Bruce I. Knight, Under Sec'y, USDA & Dr.

James M. MurphyJr., Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. for Agric. Affs., Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, to Mariano Fernandez, Ambassador, Republic of Chile, Chile-U.S., Nov. 21,

2008, T.I.A.S. No. 08-1121 (limiting the application of USDA standards on grapes to a specified time of year for a period of five years); Agreement on the Safety of Drugs and Medical
Devices, U.S.-China, Dec. 11, 2007, T.I.A.S. No. 07-1211; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the European Community on the Coordination

of Energy-Efficiency Labelling Programs for Office Equipment, U.S.-Eur., Dec. 28, 2006,
Hein's No. KAV 8323.
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makes the hiddenness of TEAs additionally troublesome-far beyond that
of other executive agreements. Their application, monitoring, and
engagement needs are more acute than those with respect to agreements
that create only administrative commitments for the U.S. government.
Business actors depend on them and use them regularly. Compare those
needs to other agreements monitored by the State Department that do not
involve "citizen users," for example. 53
Third, making TEAs public or at least available to Congress is also a
matter of constitutional accountability. Given that the executive's authority with respect to foreign commerce is all delegated, Congress has a special interest in monitoring the outcomes of the deployment of such authority. Nothing about the legal distribution of authority in this space
suggests that, because these agreements are sometimes small or informal
or involve typical executive functions, they need not be vetted or overseen
by Congress. In fact, there is considerable "process" writ large in the relationship between Congress and the executive on trade, including extensive
consultation requirements.54 Congress views itself as USTR's client. 55 The
statutory framework is silent as to any special arrangement governing the
relationship between and among the trade-engaged agencies-more than
one of which may be involved in a single TEA-and the State Department
on reporting TEAs. In this sense, TEAs are an aberration in their seemingly casual invisibility, and their informality has led to opaqueness. 56
The current structure lacks any oversight backstop and any opportunity to
review projected content. Especially in light of the absence of judicial
review-even if courts would be poor intermediaries in the context of
interbranch disagreement here-transparency is one means by which to
check whether the executive exceeded delegated authority.
Fourth, there are undoubtedly more TEAs to come. Prior to his inauguration, President Biden indicated his aversion to large-scale trade agreements, 57 which means smaller "skinny" or "mini" deals are likely to be
favored. Members of Congress and commentators have suggested the
53. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America

and Colombia, Colom.-U.S., July 24, 1990, T.IA.S. No. 12417 (governing the relationship
between the United States and Colombia with regard to the latter's cooperation and assis-

tance in investigations and proceedings pertaining to the seizure or forfeiture of property
in narcotics trafficking and related criminal activity).
54. See, e.g., Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, Guidelines for Consultation and

Engagement 1 (2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%20Guidelines%20for
%20Consultation%20and%20Engagement.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9QT-HUVZ] (setting
out the guidelines for consultation between USTR and members of Congress).

&

55. See Hearing on U.S. Trade Policy Agenda Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
115th Cong. 21 (2018) (statement of Rep. Kevin Brady, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways
Means).
56. See Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Ad-

ministrative Law, 115 Yale L.J. 1490, 1538 (2006) (discussing the danger of TEAs).
57. See Steelworkers' Federal Candidate Questionnaire, supra note 4.
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same. 58 If FTAs are moved to the back burner, the Biden Administration
will continue to advance U.S. interests through TEAs.59
While there are surely still other reasons for addressing the invisibility
of TEAs, such as the ethical dimensions at play, these four alone make clear
the need for reform. The time for that reform is now, and the next Part
turns to the options.
IV. REFORMED REPORTING
If the Biden Administration is committed to the "highest standards of
transparency" in foreign policy,60 TEAs are a reasonable place to start. Two
issues arise: making TEAs publicly available and engaging with Congress
about them. Both are important, but they may require different solutions.
With respect to the former, there is some low-hanging fruit. For one, a
simple way to address at least those agreements that the government is able
to locate is to upload them to the USTR website and add links to the USTR
Annual Report that take the reader to each document. Such a system
would at least make available those agreements that USTR has on file and
presumably others that it can get from partner agencies. USTR could centralize these with a simple database, putting all trade-related agreements in one place, true to its statutory authority as the clearinghouse for
U.S. trade policymaking and the lead on the "trade agreements program"-a program that has evolved considerably over time to the point of
today's lack of clarity on its contours. Doing so with congressional endorsement would also help clarify agency roles and avoid interagency disputes
over agreements.
This suggestion is similar to the one made about executive agreements generally by Oona Hathaway, Curt Bradley, and Jack Goldsmith in a
recent article, but it is worth setting trade agreements apart. Those scholars have rightly noted the ways in which the general organizational system

58. See, e.g., Lawmakers, Analysts Eye New TPA as an Opportunity for Change, Inside
U.S. Trade (Mar. 11, 2021), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/lawmakers-analysts-eyenew-tpa-opportunity-change (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that some members of Congress support smaller deals).
59. The Biden Administration has already announced some interest in deals, and
members of Congress have supported still more. See, e.g., Tai, Brazilian Minister Discuss

Updated Trade Deal Signed Last Year, Inside U.S. Trade (May 18, 2021), https://
insidetrade.com/trade/tai-brazilian-minister-discuss-updated-trade-deal-signed-last-year
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Peter Martin, Eric Martin & Saleha Mohsin, Biden

Team Weighs Digital Trade Deal to Counter China in Asia, Bloomberg (July 12, 2021),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-12/biden-team-weighs-digital-tradedeal-to-counter-china-in-asia (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated July 13,

2021).
60. Memorandum on Revitalizing America's Foreign Policy and National Security
Workforce, Institutions, and Partnerships, 2021 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 1 (Feb. 4, 2021).
61. See Hathaway et al., supra note 23, at 700-04 (arguing that agreements ought to
be made public by the State Department, for example, through the FederalRegister).
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for executive agreements needs repair and have recommended that Congress institute a requirement that executive agreements be published in
the Federal Register by the State Department.62 These are not mutually
exclusive-once USTR adds links for easy access from its annual report
and website, those also can be shared with the State Department. There
may be still other alternatives to achieve the same public-facing transparency, such as using a neutral third-party repository or independent commission or empowering the International Trade Commission, which also
has a trade agreements program role. 63 But creating an additional layer of
bureaucracy by going through another agency is not necessary. USTR has
a reasonable start with its Annual Report that covers more agreements
than the State Department's collection. Now it needs to go beyond the list
approach to provide the texts themselves.
The bigger difficulties with this arrangement are the fragmentation
and disaggregation of trade lawmaking across the trade administrative
state and modern trade lawmaking's concomitant diverse forms. Such
diversity poses a problem for any centralization when it comes to TEAs.
The many agencies that are now engaged in diagonal rulemaking through
the conclusion of TEAs with foreign counterparts sometimes do not consider what they are doing to rise to the level of "executive agreement" falling within the scope of any collection effort, whether at USTR or at the
State Department. For example, USDA maintains its own collection of
agricultural trade agreements that it has negotiated often in partnership
with USTR called "work plans," which govern the terms of the import and
export of certain agricultural products.64 These work plans are not available from USDA, despite its representations to the contrary in prior rulemakings,65 and they do not make the cut in USTR's Annual Report despite
governing the import, export, and harmonization of agricultural products.66 This question as to what constitutes a trade deal is one that requires
further study by both branches and by scholars.
Another recommendation made by Hathaway, Bradley, and Goldsmith for executive agreement transparency is that Congress could withhold appropriations for implementation where agencies fail to pub62. See id.
of

63. See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Publ'n No. 5228, The Year in Trade 2020: Operation
the Trade Agreements Program, 72d Report (2021), https://www.usitc.gov/

publications/332/pub5228.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MSW-4VSS].
64. See, e.g., E-mail from Professor Guillermo Garcia Sanchez, Assoc. Professor, Tex.

A&M Univ. Sch. of L. to author (Nov. 2, 2021) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing a request equivalent to a Freedom of Information Act request made to the Mexican
government that produced a document listing the work plan).
65. USDA has said that they are available upon request. Revision of Fruits and Vegeta-

bles Import Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,482, 39,484 (July 18, 2007). When requested by
this author's team, however, USDA declined to provide them. See E-mail from Abbey Powell,
Acting Chief of Staff, Plant Prot. & Quarantine, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Serv.,

USDA, to author (June 22, 2020) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
66. Annual Report, supra note 1, at Annex II.
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lish agreements.67 While likely useful if adopted for other types of executive agreements, that recommendation is difficult to square with the TEA
experience. The threat of withheld funds is of little use in trade for several
reasons. First, such a requirement may lead executive agencies to carry out
these negotiations in the shadows even more than they do now-either
because agencies may seek to deploy general appropriations in service of
TEAs without making that known or because agencies may try to make or
change TEAs through alternative workstreams to avoid such scrutiny. TEAS
could be negotiated, changing regulations and imposing rules, and then
operationalized without broad awareness as to their source. At least now,
TEAs are often announced even if they are not made available to the public and Congress. Moreover, that penalty could have another opposite
effect from what Congress would intend: The executive may decline to
engage in negotiations at all for fear of running afoul of congressional
authority and endangering other workstreams of importance.
In the case of TEAs, many of which create market access opportunities
for U.S. businesses, members of Congress often have an interest in such
agreements moving forward. Accordingly, Congress is not incentivized to
hold back funds even when it knows about the agreement. Further, whose
funds would be withheld? The agencies making and maintaining these
agreements are scattered across the executive branch, and it is often not
clear which delegation matches which implementation. If USTR negotiates an agreement that Customs and Border Protection cannot
implement, what then? That scenario could risk international and domestic litigation that runs contrary to both branches' goals. Finally, most agreements do not require funding, so withholding appropriations made for
such negotiations would be difficult and nearly impossible to do as a matter separate from the rest of an agency's work, particularly in the case of
USTR. A general reduction in funding for some of these agencies is
unlikely to be in the United States' best interest. The executive agreement
universe would appear not to be a one-size-fits-all environment. Trade law,
as a specially situated area, requires a tailored solution.
Second, USTR may need more staff and more staff time to account
for known missing agreements, as well as those that are yet to come. The
limited capacity of the foreign commerce bureaucracy has undoubtedly
contributed to the present state of play. As of now, the agencies involved
can barely keep track of the agreements they have. 68 There is little incentive for them to add more work to their already taxed portfolios with an
agreement scavenger hunt or detailed reporting. As noted, overwork and
differently directed resources have inhibited the agency from taking the
necessary steps to preserve and maintain records, especially for small
agreements that are not in the public eye.69 Congress could appropriate

67. See Hathaway et al., supra note 23, at 707.
68. See supra Part II.
69. See supra Part II.
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additional funding specifically for this purpose, such as to enhance the
USTR Chief Transparency Officer's staff. As of now, that officer has none,
and the role has often been assigned to another political officer such as
the General Counsel.7 0
As for reporting to Congress, the TEA experience confirms the need
to revise and update the Case Act. To be sure, the purpose of sharing agreements with Congress ought to be for Congress to review either for approval
or implementation or for the opportunity to engage with the executive
before the agreement enters into force. Nothing about the current system
achieves either of these goals. Moreover, while the Case Act may be useful-even if outdated given the technology of today-for nontrade agreements regarding which Congress has little skin in the game,
Congress's constitutional prerogative in trade law counsels in favor of a
separate accounting and reporting system. Most TEAs entered into force
after the Case Act and may not have been anticipated in scope or scale at
that time.71 And given trade's special place in law and policy and its separate institutional framework, it is not obvious that TEAs ought to go
through the same reporting processes as other executive agreements.
Congress has spoken to this insufficiency only meekly. The Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 added a restriction to the President's negotiating authority, prohibiting the branch from entering into
certain TEAs when not preapproved by Congress.72 To date, however,
members have not invoked this statutory provision to push back on the
executive's extensive use of TEAs. In some instances, members have en73
couraged such negotiations.
Recently, some members of Congress have proposed reforms to the
Case Act,74 but the changes in legislation made public to date are inadequate to solve trade's transparency problems. For example, one proposal
seeks to add a Chief International Agreements Officer to agencies engaged

70. See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Releases
Agency Transparency Principles (May 7, 2021), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/

press-office/press-releases/2021/may/ustr-releases-agency-transparency-principles
//perma.cc/A2TF-KDDB].

[https:

71. At that time, it would appear that fewer than seventy TEAS were in force (based on
this author's calculation in view of this author's TEA database).

72. See 19 U.S.C. § 3805(a) (4) (2018).
73. See Isabelle Icso, Analysts Weigh Benefits, Drawbacks of 'Sectoral' Trade Deals,
Inside U.S. Trade (Jan. 28, 2021), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/analysts-weigh-benefits-drawbacks-'sectoral'-trade-deals (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Isabelle Icso,
India's Trade Minister Hopes to Negotiate 'Fresh' Package With Biden, Inside U.S. Trade
(Feb. 17, 2021), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/india's-trade-minister-hopes-negotiate-'fresh'-package-biden (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Margaret Spiegelman,
Portman Calls for New Trade Deal With Ecuador, Stronger Regional Ties, Inside U.S. Trade
(July
16,
2021),
https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/portman-calls-new-trade-dealequador-stronger-regional-ties (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
74. See, e.g., United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021, S. 1260, 117th

Cong. § 3310 (2021).
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in cross-border negotiation, 75 but that just enables yet another person to
argue with the State Department as to what qualifies for its process and
what should be set apart.
Only now is a clear sense emerging of the full scope and reach of
executive agreements and TEAs. The preliminary findings suggest that
TEAs, in light of their separate processes and impact, merit bespoke consideration in other ways. Further intensifying these struggles is the fact that
agencies treat TEAS as falling outside administrative law disciplines. Hathaway has explored the prospects for an Administrative Procedure Act
approach to executive agreements generally. 76 If any agreements warrant
such treatment, it is certainly TEAs, or at least those TEAs that are functionally equivalent to regulation.
Finally, TEAs would benefit from additional disciplines that do not
exist for other agreements regarding exit from the agreements. At present,
no general statutory scheme requires the executive to notify Congress
when it intends to withdraw from or terminate an agreement. Congress
has not reserved for legislative scrutiny and decisionmaking the conclusion of any trade-related deals, unlike its treatment of the creation of
those deals. Scholars have explored the separation of powers problems of
leaving treaties and congressional-executive agreements but often take for
granted that executive agreements are left to the executive even at the exit
stage. 77 That may be logically coherent, but, even if so, the executive lacks
guidelines on how it ought to report to Congress and to publish public
information about agreements going out of force. There is little evidence
to suggest, however, that they ever go out of force. 78 The executive tends
to "agree over" past agreements rather than dispense and redo. More
recent agreements may make reference to prior agreements and declare
them to be superseded, but little of that is tracked and publicized. Instead,
79
the numbers would suggest that TEAs only grow in number over time.
Reform is needed to capture U.S. exit from TEAs and likely across most
other executive agreements as well.
CONCLUSION

The first year of the Biden Administration-an Administration that
has prized transparency and downplayed massive free trade agreementspresents a prime opportunity to address these deficiencies in the TEA
transparency regime, particularly as Trade Promotion Authority legislation
75. Id. § 3310(a)(6).
76. See

Oona

A. Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the

Balance, 119 Yale L.J. 140, 147-48 (2009).
77. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential Power to Terminate International
Agreements, 128 Yale L.J. Forum 432, 435 (2018). See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting
Treaties, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1579 (2005) (discussing state practice on treaty withdrawal).
78. See Claussen, Mini-Deals, supra note 16, at 30.

79. See id. at 30-31.
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is reconsidered and reviewed. 80 Distinct from other executive agreements
in subject, process, form, and significance, TEAs merit swift attention and
simple reform to keep both Congress and the public informed. If the
Administration does not do so, Congress is likely to make its own revisions
that might constrain the executive branch in unhelpful ways with respect
to these helpful agreements.

80. See Margaret Spiegelman, Tai Wants TPA Overhauled With Bipartisan Support,
Doesn't Commit to Timeline, Inside U.S. Trade (May 13, 2021), https://insidetrade.
com/daily-news/tai-wants-tpa-overhauled-bipartisan-support-doesn't-commit-timeline
(on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing how Trade Promotion Authority legislation
is under debate by the Biden Administration and members of Congress).

